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ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS ABOUT JUDGE 
AND JURY COMPETENCE 
GREGORY MITCHELL* 
 We should ask at least two questions when considering taking a 
task away from juries and giving it to judges on grounds that juries 
perform the task suboptimally:1 Is there good reason to believe that 
judges will perform the task better? What perverse effects may we 
introduce with this change in tasks?2 Despite the commonsense basis 
for these questions, surprisingly little research exists to answer ei-
ther one.3 Fortunately, Jennifer Robbennolt’s contribution to this 
symposium issue provides a very helpful synthesis of the existing 
empirical research that compares the decisions of judges and juries, 
which leads to a tentative negative answer to the first question,4 and 
elsewhere Robbennolt partially answers the second question.5 Profes-
sor Robbennolt asks and answers the right questions about the allo-
cation of duties between jury and judge, but we need much more re-
search on judicial competence to correct the imbalance relative to the 
large amount of research on jury competence.6  
                                                                                                                    
 * Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. This paper 
benefited from discussions at the symposium on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institu-
tions held at the Florida State University College of Law. 
 1. Most notable in recent times is the considerable effort directed at reducing the 
jury’s role in setting punitive damages because jurors supposedly perform this task poorly. 
See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, What Should Be Done?, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE 242, 242 (2002) (“We have seen that jurors face many problems in trying to gener-
ate a sensible system of punitive damage awards.”); Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge or 
Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive Damages?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089, 1089 (1996) (“Over 
the past two decades, state legislatures throughout the nation have sharply altered the 
manner in which punitive damages are awarded. . . . As part of this trend, the state legis-
latures of several states took from jurors the power to assess punitive damages and placed 
it in the hands of the trial judge.” (footnotes omitted)).  
 2. Cf. Reid Hastie, Putting It All Together, in PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE, supra note 1, at 211, 234 (“If we are critical of the jury’s performance when decid-
ing on punitive damages, it is important to ask: What is the alternative to a jury?”). 
 3. See Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A 
Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 470-71 & nn. 5-6 (2005) (summarizing 
the state of the research on judge versus jury competence). 
 4. See id. at 509 (“While there appear to be some differences in outcomes under some 
circumstances, judges and jurors generally appear to be influenced by similar factors and 
suffer from many of the same difficulties in making their decisions.”). For a recent study 
presenting evidence that juries award punitive damages more frequently and in higher 
amounts than judges, see Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Judges 
and Juries Perform, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2004).  
 5. On possible perverse effects from limiting the authority of juries to set punitive 
damages, see Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights 
and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 171 (2002) (“The experimental research 
suggests that caps [on damages] may have the counterintuitive effects of increasing both 
the size and variability of punitive damage awards in some cases.”). 
 6. See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 471 (“Compared to the extensive study of the de-
cisionmaking of jurors and juries, there has been relatively little examination of trial 
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 Before even reaching the question of the relative competence of 
judges and jurors, however, we should ask at least two questions 
about the research ostensibly indicating that a factfinder performs a 
task suboptimally: Are the research conclusions valid and generaliz-
able to the settings of interest? Does the research utilize the proper 
test of optimal performance?7 When Brian Bornstein and Sean 
McCabe ask whether we should be concerned with the necessary use 
of hypothetical outcomes in trial simulations,8 they raise an impor-
tant but often neglected issue that implicates both the validity and 
generalizability of experimental factfinder research. Furthermore, 
Professor Robbennolt notes the difficulty that can arise in choosing 
the proper test of optimality.9  
 The consequentiality issue addressed by Bornstein and McCabe 
raises construct validity concerns because mock jurors and judges de-
ciding hypothetical cases with imaginary outcomes perform a task 
indisputably and inevitably different from the task of jurors and 
judges deciding actual cases with real consequences.10 Nevertheless, 
                                                                                                                    
judges’ decisionmaking, and even fewer studies have directly compared the decisionmaking 
of juries and judges.”). Robbennolt and other participants in the conference are working to 
correct this imbalance. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777 (2001); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damage Decision Making: 
The Decisions of Citizens and Trial Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315 (2002).   
 7. Cook and Campbell divide questions about research validity and generalizability 
into four useful subcategories: (1) statistical conclusion validity, which concerns whether 
conclusions about statistically detected covariation among variables represent real or spu-
rious relationships; (2) internal validity, which concerns whether conclusions about the 
causal relationship among variables represent valid conclusions; (3) construct validity, 
which concerns whether the constructs of interest have been properly operationalized for 
research purposes and whether generalizations about these constructs from the research 
setting to other settings can be validly made; and (4) external validity, which refers to the 
degree to which conclusions about the relationships among variables as found in the re-
search setting can be generalized to other populations of persons, situations, and times. 
THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS 
ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS 37-39 (1979). For an interesting discussion of Campbell’s de-
velopment of the internal and external validity constructs, see Linda Albright & Thomas 
E. Malloy, Experimental Validity: Brunswik, Campbell, Cronbach, and Enduring Issues, 4 
REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 337, 340-43 (2000). 
 8. See Brian H. Bornstein & Sean G. McCabe, Jurors of the Absurd? The Role of 
Consequentiality in Jury Simulation Research, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 443 (2005). 
 9. See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 502 (“One problem with comparing the decision-
making of juries to that of judges is that to the extent that there are differences in the de-
cisionmaking of judges and juries, there is not always a clear benchmark for determining 
which group’s decision is normatively better.”). 
 10. Another way to think of this construct validity concern is as an ever-present con-
found in the experiment: Is the mock jury’s behavior attributable to the independent vari-
able(s) or the lack of consequences? 
 The lack of consequences ranks with the lack of deliberation in trial simulations as the 
most pressing construct validity concerns in factfinder research. See David R. Shaffer & 
Shannon R. Wheatman, Does Personality Influence Reactions to Judicial Instructions? 
Some Preliminary Findings and Possible Implications, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 655, 
657 (2000) (“In our opinion, perhaps the greatest limitation of mock-trial simulations is 
that the vast majority of them attempt to draw inferences from decisions rendered by non-
2005]                         ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 521 
 
if the limited research comparing hypothetical and consequential de-
cisionmaking uniformly found little or no difference between the con-
sequential and inconsequential decisions, then we could dismiss this 
difference as insubstantial. Unfortunately, the research findings are 
mixed.11 Furthermore, although the simulations used in jury re-
search may prime the same cold cognitive processes primed in actual 
trials, the greater concern is that trial simulations fail to capture 
adequately the hotter cognitive processes involved in actual trials. 
Examples of the hotter cognitive processes include the emotions trig-
gered by violent crimes and the stress of potentially erroneous deci-
sionmaking in high-stakes cases, not to mention the personal and 
economic pressures on jurors that may arise from extended or highly 
publicized trials. Indeed, experimental designs typically strive to 
eliminate subject concerns about being held accountable for their de-
cisions,12 yet these concerns may play a powerful role in the actions of 
judges and jurors in actual trials. 
 It is ethically impossible to do laboratory research that would 
elicit the kinds of emotions and stress involved in many real cases, 
and it is next to impossible to receive approval from a human sub-
                                                                                                                    
deliberating mock jurors rather than deliberating mock juries.”). The deliberation issue, 
however, has been investigated much more than the consequentiality issue. See generally 
Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliber-
ating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001). 
 11. Bornstein and McCabe summarize the small and conflicting body of research on 
the consequentiality issue that has been conducted within the field of factfinder research. 
See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 8, at 452-57. As Bornstein and McCabe note, there is 
some good evidence from research on framing effects that decisions with real and hypo-
thetical consequences do not differ significantly, see id. at 462-65, but overall the evidence 
on incentives and consequences is mixed, see, e.g., Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A 
Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision Making, 61 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 250 (1995) (“[E]vidence suggests that extrinsic incentives 
sometimes increase, sometimes decrease, and sometimes have no effect on decision qual-
ity.”).  Thus, it is impossible to draw univocal conclusions about the effect of real conse-
quences on decision processes. Cf. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of 
Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 
19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34 (1999) (“The data show that incentives sometimes im-
prove performance, but often don’t. This unsurprising conclusion implies that we should 
immediately push beyond debating the caricatured positions that incentives always help or 
never help. Adopting either position, or pretending that others do, is empirically misguided 
and scientifically counterproductive.”). 
 12. See Karen Seigel-Jacobs & J. Frank Yates, Effects of Procedural and Outcome Ac-
countability on Judgment Quality, 65 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 1 (1996). 
Interestingly, although a great many real-world judgment and decision-making 
situations clearly include some level of accountability, most laboratory studies 
of judgment and decision-making are deliberately designed to minimize this 
factor. For example, subjects are generally told that any responses they make 
during the course of the experiment will be kept strictly confidential and 
anonymous, and there are seldom any real consequences for making “good” ver-
sus “bad” judgments or decisions. 
Id. at 1-2. 
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jects committee to do experiments that would deceptively lead par-
ticipants to believe they were making consequential decisions. It is 
also extremely rare to perform quasi-experimental factfinder re-
search in court settings.13 For these reasons, the only viable solution 
to the construct validity problem raised by the consequentiality issue 
would seem to be a multimethod approach along the lines proposed 
by Bornstein and McCabe: supplement trial simulations with obser-
vational and survey research involving jurors and judges from real 
trials, utilize shadow juries in real cases, and perform experimental 
and quasi-experimental research on actual decisionmakers in admin-
istrative settings that may be more permissive of such research.14 
Until we have convergence on the importance of the consequentiality 
dimension of factfinder decisionmaking across a range of settings and 
methods, the construct validity of decisions made in trial simulations 
will rightly remain highly suspect.15 
 The consequentiality issue raises external validity concerns be-
cause individuals may react differently in making hypothetical ver-
sus consequential decisions and because consequences of different 
magnitudes and types may have quite different psychological and 
behavioral effects both within and across individuals.16 While all hy-
pothetical decisions have no consequences for the hypothetical par-
ties and at most very limited social and self-evaluative consequences 
for the decisionmakers in these hypothetical cases, consequences for 
the parties in real cases can range from nominal damages to death 
penalties and pose much greater potential social and personal costs 
to the decisionmaker. A demonstration of external validity in trial 
simulations requires a demonstration that both the subjects and 
situations sampled in the experiments are representative of the fact-
                                                                                                                    
 13. The Arizona Jury Project involved the first experimental manipulation using real 
juries, with juries being randomly assigned to conditions in which discussion of evidence 
was or was not allowed before the close of evidence. The project also involved the taping of 
actual jury deliberations, which has happened in only three other instances. See Shari 
Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. 
REV. 1857, 1867-71 (2001) (describing the Arizona Jury Project and discussing prior re-
search involving jury deliberations). 
 14. See Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 8, at 465-66. 
 15. Note that the consequentiality/construct validity issue implicates many aspects of 
factfinder behavior, though its implications are most direct for ultimate decisions on liabil-
ity and damages. For instance, jury attention to and comprehension of instructions could 
vary with the consequences of a trial.   
 16. On the latter point, Camerer and Hogarth note: 
The data show that higher levels of incentives have the largest effects in judg-
ment and decision tasks. Incentives improve performance in easy tasks that are 
effort responsive, like judgment, prediction, problem-solving, recalling items 
from memory, or clerical tasks. Incentives sometimes hurt when problems are 
too difficult or when simple intuition or habit provides an optimal answer and 
thinking harder makes things worse.  
Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 11, at 34.  
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finders and trial situations to which the results are deemed induc-
tively instructive.17  
 The external validity problem posed by the consequentiality issue 
is more tractable than the construct validity problem because we can 
examine a diverse range of subject and situational subpopulations in 
experimental settings. Moreover, the hypothetical stakes of simu-
lated decisions may easily be varied to examine how judgments about 
evidence and decisions in cases shift with hypothetical consequences 
to determine the generality of behavior in simulations.18  
 Just as foundational as the questions about the validity and gen-
eralizability of trial simulations19 is the question of what are the 
proper normative criteria for assessing judge or jury competence, an 
issue which Robbennolt alludes to in her article.20 Answering this 
question of proper normative standards presents a host of additional 
difficulties, some quite tractable and others resistant to easy solu-
tions. First, the researcher must make a judgment about the goals 
that should be sought by a factfinder in performing a particular task, 
such as achieving truth or rationality in decisions about criminal 
guilt or civil liability. For instance, a jury’s decision may be evalu-
ated in relation to the empirical facts (did the convicted defendant 
actually commit the murder?) or in relation to an ideal treatment of 
evidence presented at trial in light of the rules of evidence and the 
rules of statistical inference (did the jury draw rational inferences 
from the evidence presented at trial in light of the jury’s instruc-
tions?).21 The choice of proper goals is crucial because different goals, 
                                                                                                                    
 17. Egon Brunswik, Representative Design and Probabilistic Theory in a Functional 
Psychology, in THE ESSENTIAL BRUNSWIK: BEGINNINGS, EXPLICATIONS, APPLICATIONS 135, 
140 (Kenneth R. Hammond & Thomas R. Stewart eds., 2001) (“As we cannot possibly hope 
to encompass the entire population of individuals in research, but must sample representa-
tively, we must sample instances in the study of functional achievement.”). 
 18. Interestingly, Kühberger and his colleagues, in their study of framing effects in 
real and hypothetical gambles, found similar effects of the magnitude of consequences for 
both real and hypothetical decisions, which suggests that trial simulations may usefully 
examine hypothetical cases with a range of consequences. See Anton Kühberger et al., 
Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 1162, 1173 (2002) (“In conclusion, we found that the size of the incentive influ-
enced participants’ choices. Paradoxically, for ‘incentive theory,’ the high incentive has the 
same effect in the real and hypothetical gambles.”). 
 19. Bornstein & McCabe, supra note 8.  
 20. See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 502. 
 21. Friedland emphasizes accuracy as the goal of juror decisionmaking, see Steven I. 
Friedland, The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 NW. U. L. 
REV. 190, 195 (1990) (“[A]ccurate juror decisionmaking is a predicate to a public perception 
of fair decisionmaking.”), while Diamond emphasizes adherence to the law given the diffi-
culty of determining accuracy:  
To assess how the jury operates as a decision-maker, we cannot compare the 
jury’s verdict with some gold standard of truth because no such dependable 
standard exists. . . . 
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or different norms for implementing those goals, may point to differ-
ent conclusions about competence.22 A jury presented with inade-
quate evidence at trial may irrationally convict the truly guilty de-
fendant, while another jury presented with this inadequate evidence 
may rationally acquit the truly guilty defendant. The first jury did a 
good job under the correspondence standard but a poor job under the 
coherence standard, and conversely, the second jury performed well 
under the coherence standard but poorly under the correspondence 
standard. Hence, the choice of normative criteria controls the as-
sessment of the factfinder’s competence on particular tasks, and the 
choice of goal determines the choice of normative criteria.23 
 Second, because there may be disputes about the goals that 
should be served by certain tasks, the researcher must employ mul-
tiple, possibly conflicting normative criteria or justify her choice of 
                                                                                                                    
 We can, in contrast, say something about the quality of juror decision-making 
by assessing whether the jurors have considered relevant facts and legal in-
structions in arriving at their verdicts. 
Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 
150-51 (2003). 
 The first approach, which emphasizes accuracy, follows from a correspondence metathe-
ory of good judgment and decisionmaking: “The goal of a correspondence metatheory is to 
describe and explain the process by which a person’s judgments achieve empirical accu-
racy.” Kenneth R. Hammond, Coherence and Correspondence Theories in Judgment and 
Decision Making, in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 53, 
53 (Terry Connolly et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000). The second approach, which emphasizes adher-
ence to rules, follows from a coherence metatheory of good judgment and decisionmaking: 
“The goal of a coherence metatheory of judgment . . . is to describe and explain the process 
by which a person’s judgments achieve logical, or mathematical, or statistical rationality.” 
Id. 
 22. Some goals, such as accuracy in decisionmaking, require no more specific imple-
menting norms to assess competence: the decision is simply reviewed for its correspon-
dence to the empirical facts. Other goals, such as rationality in decisionmaking, require 
more specific norms to implement the goal and conduct the competence evaluation. For in-
stance, within economics, rational choice typically means the maximization of expected 
utility or subjective expected utility, and within this view the maximization of utility re-
quires fidelity to axioms put forward by von Neumann and Morgenstern or Savage or vari-
ants thereof. See generally Peter C. Fishburn, Decision Theory: The Next 100 Years?, 101 
ECON. J. 27 (1991); Paul J.H. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Pur-
poses, Evidence and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 529 (1982). Within the legal set-
ting, rational factfinding requires adherence both to applicable legal rules and rules of 
probability for evaluating evidence under conditions of uncertainty or ambiguity. As dis-
cussed below, choosing these implementing norms may present additional complications.  
 23. Discussions of factfinder competence typically employ external measures of com-
petence, rather than internal measures that ask whether the factfinder achieved its own 
self-chosen goals. Because we are interested in how factfinders fulfill their roles within the 
larger legal-institutional setting, it is fair to impose values and goals on the factfinder that 
the factfinder might not endorse or that might even be contrary to the factfinder’s own 
goals or values. A finding of external incompetence thus does not mean that the factfinder 
was incompetent from an internal perspective; it only means that the factfinder failed to 
meet an externally imposed normative standard. Indeed, a factfinder may be deemed ex-
ternally incompetent precisely because the factfinder is quite competent at achieving a 
goal that is internally desirable but undesirable from an institutional, external standpoint. 
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some normative criteria to the exclusion of others.24 Otherwise, the 
research may be dismissed as irrelevant or disputed on grounds of 
incompleteness.25   
 Third, even if there is no dispute over the proper goal to be served 
by a particular task, there may be dispute over the proper normative 
criteria for judging whether that goal has been achieved. For in-
stance, when juries make judgments about the reasonableness of a 
party’s actions, one of the goals, and perhaps the primary goal, is to 
inject objectivity into the proceedings and transcend the subjective 
perceptions of the parties.26 Yet it is not at all clear how best to as-
sess a jury’s competence at being reasonable and objective.27 Another 
                                                                                                                    
 24. Or it may be that different legal systems embrace different goals, and it may be 
impracticable to consider all of the different goals within a single study if each goal re-
quires a variation in design to test for optimal performance. 
 25. We see some debate of this nature within the field of punitive damages research. 
For instance, although Professor Sharkey disputes some of the details of the empirical 
work by Sunstein and others that questions the coherence of punitive damages awarded by 
juries, Sharkey’s primary difference with Sunstein and his colleagues seems to be that she 
prescribes different purposes for punitive damages than Sunstein and his colleagues. See 
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages: Should Juries Decide?, 82 TEX. L. REV. 381, 385 
(2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES DECIDE 
(2002)) (“A fuller examination of Sunstein et al.’s empirical work reveals the indetermi-
nacy—and possible inapplicability—of that research with respect to broader nonretributive 
theories of punitive damages.” ); id. at 412 (“[E]ven if Sunstein et al. may have established 
the inability of jurors to translate moral outrage into dollar awards, they have not suffi-
ciently explored the jurors’ assessment of deterrence-based or socially compensatory dam-
ages, wholly separate, but by no means exclusive, categories of punitive damages.”); see 
also Neal R. Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently?, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239, 
284-88 (2003) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JURIES 
DECIDE (2002)) (arguing that Sunstein and his colleagues fail to justify their emphasis on 
optimal deterrence as the goal of punitive damages to the exclusion of retribution as a 
goal). 
 26. See, e.g., Brian Leiter, Introduction to OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MORALS 1, 3 
(Brian Leiter ed., 2001) (“In some areas of law, we expect the law to employ ‘objective’ 
standards of conduct (like ‘reasonable person’ standards) that do not permit actors to ex-
cuse their conduct based on their subjective perceptions at the time.”). For a discussion of 
several possible interpretations and operationalizations of the reasonableness construct, 
see Neil MacCormick, Reasonableness and Objectivity, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1575, 1579-
83 (1999). 
 27. Even within negligence suits, where one might expect reasonableness to mean en-
gaging in a particular course of action only when the expected benefits outweigh the ex-
pected costs, juries typically are not instructed to perform such a balancing analysis when 
applying the reasonable-person standard. See Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social 
Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633, 639 (2003) (“In negligence 
suits, the jury instruction regarding liability is typically stated in terms of the reasonable 
person standard. Usually there is little further instruction telling the jury how to interpret 
this standard or determine the meaning of the crucial concept of reasonableness.” (footnote 
omitted)); see also Mark P. Gergen, The Jury’s Role in Deciding Normative Issues in the 
American Common Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 407, 408 n.1 (1999) (“It is a gross misunder-
standing of the law of negligence to claim that the standard of the reasonably prudent per-
son can be reduced to the Hand formula without losing something vital.”); Patrick J. Kelley 
& Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A Review of Pattern Jury 
Instructions, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 587, 618 (2002) (“[T]he cost-benefit test of negligence 
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pertinent example of indeterminacy in normative criteria involves 
the proper weight to be given to incremental bits of evidence to form 
rational judgments about guilt or liability and, in particular, whether 
Bayes’ Theorem offers the best way to adjust beliefs in light of new 
evidence.28 In such cases, little can be done but to stick stubbornly to 
one’s preferred normative view or acknowledge the debate over 
proper norms and apply multiple criteria.  
 A fourth obstacle arises when researchers must translate vague 
goals into specific norms for testing purposes.29 If the goal is to 
achieve coherence or efficiency in outcomes, for example, then the re-
searcher must come up with a way to measure coherence or effi-
ciency. Experiments provide a particularly attractive setting for ad-
dressing this problem because they allow the researcher to vary the 
dimensions of hypothetical cases to examine whether factfinder be-
havior conforms to different formulations of the vague goals. In addi-
tion, experiments require that the researcher commit beforehand to 
particular theoretical formulations of coherence, efficiency, or other 
vague goals, thus avoiding the biasing effect that preexisting views 
may have on the search for and interpretation of evidence when try-
ing to test for coherence or efficiency with actual historical cases.30  
                                                                                                                    
does not seem to be the probable meaning of even those five pattern negligence instruc-
tions couched in terms of unreasonable foreseeable risk.”). 
 28. See Alvin I. Goldman, Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence, 42 
JURIMETRICS J. 237, 238 (2002). For example, Goldman notes: 
Bayesianism is a popular approach to legal evidence. Entire books have been 
devoted to the analytical power of Bayesian inference and its application to le-
gal evidence. At the same time, many doubts and challenges have been raised 
to the adequacy of Bayesianism in general and its specific application to the 
law. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). For a recent example of opposition to Bayesianism, see Stuart E. 
Thiel, Probability Models of Juridical Proof: It’s Time to Kick Bayes Out on His Posterior 2 
(June 8, 2004) (unpublished manuscript) (“My thesis is that the Bayesian model poorly fits 
the problem of juridical proof, and that the statistical decision paradigm, ‘frequentist’ or 
‘classical’ statistics, is better-suited for the task and does a better job.”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=556028 (last visited Dec. 13, 2004).  
 29. In some cases, it may simply be impossible to formulate workable tests of goals, 
which may result in the selection of a second-best goal. Indeed, we might prefer that truth 
be the ultimate touchstone in factfinding, but we may have to settle for a coherence meas-
ure of competence over a correspondence measure because we lack a reliable measure of 
truth in many cases. Of course, while many of the rules of evidence can be seen as rules 
designed to lead to accurate decisionmaking, other rules endorse values other than truth 
and prevent the introduction of evidence that might improve accuracy. We may thus favor 
a coherence standard that asks whether juries follow the rules of evidence because we be-
lieve that these rules are the most feasible and manageable means to truth approximation 
in light of epistemic constraints and because of the other values contrary to truth detection 
that the trial process must serve. 
 30. Legal scholarship often employs interpretive analyses of caselaw to support vari-
ous propositions, yet such interpretive analyses raise serious selection bias problems be-
cause of the unrepresentative samples of caselaw typically used. For instance, Christopher 
Bruce reviewed articles published in The Journal of Legal Studies between 1972 and 1988 
and found little evidence of the use of random sampling of cases in law and economic stud-
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 The final component in the examination of factfinder incompe-
tence is the search for causal mechanisms: once we apply a norm and 
find suboptimal behavior through valid and reliable research meth-
ods, we should ask why the factfinder fails to achieve the goal in 
question, in hopes of improving performance or learning whether the 
goal is unrealistic. As Robbennolt notes, judges and jurors occupy 
drastically different positions in terms of decision process, knowl-
edge, and other resources.31 By better understanding whether judges 
and juries differ in their behavior, and if so, why, we may begin to 
exploit the comparative advantages of the judge and jury or refashion 
procedures to eradicate any unwanted differences and better achieve 
the desired goals through either factfinder. Indeed, rather than as-
sume that judges or juries will do a better job than the other at some 
particular task when suboptimal behavior is observed in one or the 
other, we should engage in task analysis to understand why the task 
was so difficult in the first place. It may be that no judge or jury 
should be expected to perform a task optimally given the demands or 
constraints of the situation, in which case it is the task that needs 
change rather than the assignment of the task to judges versus ju-
ries.32 
                                                                                                                    
ies published in that journal during that period. See Christopher J. Bruce, A Positive 
Analysis of Methodology in the Law and Economics Literature, 12 HAMLINE L. REV. 197, 
219 (1989) (“It was found that random samples were rarely used in the discussions of both 
tort and contract law. Random sampling was found to have become more prevalent over 
time, but not to have dominated non-random sampling.”). Recently, Penelope Pether made 
the more radical argument that published American caselaw in general provides an in-
complete and biased picture of the law as it really exists and is applied. Penelope Pether, 
Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. 
REV. 1435, 1441 (2004) (“[T]here is credible evidence of the tendency for the practices of 
private judging to corrupt the operation of the courts and the administration of justice . . . 
.”); see also David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asy-
lum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (available in an ear-
lier version as David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: An Empirical Investigation of 
Ideology and Publication on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=602861 (last visited Feb. 1, 2005)) (arguing that ideol-
ogy may bias judicial decisions about which cases are published versus unpublished).  One 
need not agree with Pether’s argument, however, to recognize that published caselaw is a 
poor sample for examining the competence of judges and juries given the paucity of impor-
tant details (especially in jury trials), the disparities among trial judges in propensity to 
publish opinions, the relative paucity of reported decisions from state trial courts as com-
pared to federal courts, and the difficulty of establishing whether published cases fairly 
represent the universe of cases.   
 31. See Robbennolt, supra note 3, at 502-06. 
 32. David Schkade provides an excellent example of the value of taking this task de-
sign perspective once suboptimal behavior is observed, and the conclusion from his analy-
sis of the task of setting punitive damages is worth repeating here: 
If jury punitive damage awards surprise us and seem unpredictable, it is due 
more to the situation that jurors find themselves in than to the characteristics 
of the jurors themselves. Several features of the task of assessing an amount of 
punitive damages seem almost designed to produce erratic awards. Unfortu-
nately, it is not clear that these flaws can be corrected while retaining the full 
 
